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The question under discussion is: what are ethical values, how
are they derived, and how do these values affect the decision of
cases, the formulation of statutes, and the framing of constitutions?
If we want to answer this question thoroughly we are attempting
to do so a little too early, I would say, about a generation too early.
If we are more ambitious, and want to answer it completely, I
would say we are attempting to do so a couple or three centuries
too early. The science of values is in a stage today that the sci-
ence of, say, physics, was around 1650. Just imagine a group of
natural philosophers meeting in the year 1650, as they did, for
example in the Royal Society of London, and discussing, as they
did, the question: what are the laws of nature, how are they
derived, and what are their consequences for human action? There
will come a time when we can answer the question of values as
definitely as the natural scientists have answered the question of
nature. All over the world philosophers are working on the science
of value as devotedly as the natural philosophers, of Galileo's and
Newton's age, were working on the science of nature. As it turned
out, the natural philosophers solved their problems because they
developed a super-science from which they were able to select ap-
propriate frames of reference to fit their observations. This super-
science was mathematics, and they created it as they went along;
thus Newton, for example, invented the calculus. Similarly there
will come a time when no person can be a social or humanistic
scientist without knowing the super-science of the humanities,
which is to the social and humanistic sciences what mathematics is
to the natural sciences. This super-science will be the science of
axiology or the Theory of Values.
The science of law is one of the humanistic or social sciences.
It concerns a body of rules pertaining to human behavior in a par-
ticular formalized aspect. The law is the most formalized body of
social rules, and the very fact of its formalization is an intrinsic
characteristic of the law- in the same way that, say, the corsets
were intrinsic characteristics of the Victorian ladies. The corsets are
gone, but something else has taken their place. A certain formali-
zation seems to be an intrinsic characteristic of the female in so-
ciety. So with the law, although I do not want to go as far as
calling it the corsets of society. But it is of course, and for similar
reasons, let us say the discouragement or redress of impulsive
action, the formalization of the given social data.
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Where for one reason or another, the law is insufficient to ac-
count for and regulate the social facts, there recourse must be taken
to the moral law. I assume that the moral law is embodied in the
science of axiology, and shall develop for you two principles of
axiology by which we shall judge our cases - which were selected,
of course, for their refusal to conform to established legal rules.
Axiology is the science of value judgments. Value judgments
are judgments containing the word "good". Since we have to de-
cide whether the arguments and decisions in our cases are good
or bad, a science of value judgments is precisely what we need.
There are two main types of good, or value, functional or extrinsic
value and substantive or intrinsic value. The difference between
extrinsic and intrinsic value can be seen in the difference between
the statements "Jones is a good lawyer" and "Jones is good", the
latter meaning, "Jones is a good person". "A good person" is of
different axiological type than "a good lawyer". A man can be a
good lawyer and a bad person or a good person and a bad lawyer;
he can be extrinsically good and intrinsically bad or extrinsically
bad and intrinsically good, and also, of course, extrinsically good
and intrinsically good or extrinsically bad and intrinsically bad.
Extrinsic value refers to the function and intrinsic value to the
character of a person. Obviously, the intrinsic value takes pre-
cedence over the extrinsic value for it contains the sum total of all
extrinsic values. The person contains all the functions. The norm
for the extrinsic value is a science - a person to be a good lawyer
must know the law, to be a good chemist he must know chemistry,
to be a good baker he must know baking -and the norm for in-
trinsic value is the person's own conscience. Thus conscience axi-
ologically supersedes science, even the science of the lawyer,
formalized or statute law.
The definition of extrinsic value is as follows: "x is a good
C if x is a member of the class C and has all the attributes of C." In
other words, Jones is a good lawyer if (a) he has passed the Bar
examination and (b) he knows the law. If he is a lawyer but does
not know the law he is not a good lawyer. If he knows the law
but has not taken the Bar examination he is not a good lawyer. The
definition of intrinsic value follows from that of extrinsic value by
substituting the class C by the individual himself. In other words,
a person is intrinsically good if he is what he is. Intrinsic value is
the human personality itself. Both extrinsic and intrinsic value pre-
suppose correct subsumption of a species under a class. Such sub-
sumption is itself an extrinsic value, namely the exercise of a
function of judgment. In jurisprudence it is accomplished when a
case is (a) seen in its proper context or frame of reference and (b)
classified under its appropriate legal statute or rule. When extrinsic
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value- either of subsumption or of any other functional activity
- conflicts in a given case with the intrinsic value of personality,
the case must be decided in favor of the intrinsic value. Since
extrinsic good is the correspondence of class and attributes, extrin-
sic bad is the non-correspondence of class and attributes, or the
transposition of frames of reference to unfitting cases. For example,
calling a man a lawyer who doesn't know the law. These two prin-
ciples, goodness as correct subsumption, which implies badness as
transposition of frames of reference, and the supremacy of the hu-
man personality, are sufficient for the axiological determination
of our cases.
The first two cases, Oleff v. Hodapp' and Everett v. Williams2
(1725), concern the application of moral considerations to law. Ac-
cording to our axiological principles, they were both correctly de-
cided, the courts in both cases having avoided possible transposi-
tions of frames of reference.
I start with the Everett case, because of its wide implications.
This case involved the petition of an accounting by a highway rob-
ber against his alleged partner. The brief of the highway robber
constructing a robbery agreement as a partnership shows the worst
possible transposition of frames of reference, namely that of the
legal and the illegal. The indignation of the court is therefore well
understandable. Crime cannot be construed as a legal partnership.
The axiological rule is that in a lawless situation you cannot have
law, in an illegal situation you cannot have legality. Hence the
highwayman cannot come with in the class of those entitled to an
accounting.
The understanding of the principle involved, that a lawless sit-
uation excludes law, has a great number of implications, not only
for the many acts of legalizing illegitimate marriages or children,
from Anne Boleyn to Ingrid Bergman, and for questions of contract
among bandits, smugglers, and outlaws of all kinds, but also for the
larger scene of politics, concerning the question whether might
makes right, whether statutes are valid in dictatorships, whether
there can be any "law" of war and what are the bases for the valid-
ity of international law. Obviously a law of war is an impossibility
for in a criminal situation, particularly one of wholesale murder,
law is impossible. The so-called law of war is therefore an entirely
different thing from what is usually called law. The case also raises
questions as to the necessary equality of parties in contract -here
we are reminded of the minimum wage cases. The subject has been
treated by Charlie Chaplin in a movie, Monsieur Verdoux, where
murder is constructed as business. A loving father pursues murder
1 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
2 9 L. Q. Rev. 197 (1893).
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of widows to provide for his family under the motto: "War is the
extension of politics, murder is the extension of business."
The Oleff case concerns the benefit of a murderer from his
crime. Here a nephew had a joint banking account with his uncle.
The uncle was killed and the nephew convicted, in Greece, as moral
author of the crime. The court awarded him the account. It may
seem as if here we had to choose between extrinsic and intrinsic
values, but I cannot see what intrinsic value should be at stake. It
is exclusively a matter of extrinsic values, namely of the possible
application of different frames of reference to the case. The axi-
ological rule of correct subsumption seems to demand that the
legally acquired right to the deposit be continued. I agree with the
majority when they say "we are a court of law, not a theological
institution." They could also have added, we are dealing with a
civil law case and not a criminal law case. The nephew will find
his theological punishment before God and his criminal punish-
ment before the penal courts. The civil judge is not here to as-
sume these non-civil responsibilities. In my opinion, the evil of
transposition of frames of reference is greater than the evil of a
murderer's civil benefit from his crime. For this benefit is largely
fictitious. If he is a murderer and remains free it makes not much
difference whether he has or has not money since money is an in-
significant value compared to the colossal disvalue of his criminal
life- what does it benefit a man to gain even the whole world
when he loses his soul. If he does not remain free then his money
does him no good anyway. Quite legally speaking, I do not see what
new benefit in the Oleff case arises to the nephew. He was joint
owner of the account, and could at any time take out the full
amount, and that is all he can do now. The only intrinsic value
harmed is the nephew's own conscience or soul. That he deprived
his uncle of his life is not a civil law matter, but a penal and the-
ological one. That he deprived his uncle of survivorship is not an
intrinsic but an extrinsic evil, for I regard "survivorship with re-
spect to the account" not the same as "life." The question then is
only whether the extrinsic evil of his keeping his money outweighs
the extrinsic evil of disregarding the statute, and I do not think so.
I have to weigh the value of correct subsumption under statute
against the harm done by such subsumption. I do not see what
harm is done anybody by the nephew's getting the money, the more
so since the status of the widows of the uncle is doubtful. It is a
principle of both law and axiology that excessive benefit is not as
great an evil as actual harm. To prevent the latter, it seems to
me, is the core of equity. It must also be remembered that the un-
satisfactory result is partly due to the poor judgment of the uncle,
and the law is not necessarily here to redress all the wrongs arising
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from bad judgment of individuals. To say that the subsumption
would lead to a result that contradicts the moral expectancies of
the community is not an axiologically valid statement, for it all de-
pends on the axiological validity of the communal morals. Our
moral sense is still rather primitive and in the absence of a science
of values quite unreliable. We are prone to neglect the important
for the obvious. That a murderer gets money is an obvious evil,
but that he loses his personality is more important, and that he
loses his freedom or life, according to criminal law, is most impor-
tant, though not necessarily moral. The morality of retaliation is
a most doubtful one. If the moral sense of the community wants to
assert itself, it may do so in legislation, as it did later in Ohio. In-
teresting in this connection is the New York case of Riggs v.
Palmer,3 where a husband killed his wife to get her money. The
court decided that the statute of descent was inapplicable for such
application could not have been the purpose of the legislature. I
maintain that the legislature neither thought nor had to think of
such a case when making the civil law. The civil law is one thing,
the penal law is another thing. In the presence of sufficient criminal
law and theological sanction - we hope- the judges arrogated to
themselves more right than they should have. They did not redress
an obvious evil or harm to anybody, but acted as moral agents in a
primitive sense of retaliatory morality, overestimating the value of
money in the concept of "benefit." When I shoot my wife to get her
money it makes no difference to me afterwards whether I get that
money or not, for I shall die either in the electric chair or by my
own hand, as was the case in the Riggs case, or live a life so miser-
able whether I know it or not, that the money is irrelevant. We
overrate the value of money as against the value of life, as comes
out more clearly in the minimum wage cases. The Riggs case was
one of incorrect subsumption in that the statute was re-interpreted
without axiological justification. I would agree with the construc-
tive trust idea of the North Carolina case of Bryant v. Bryant4
where the statute of descent was correctly applied but remedied by
the equity device of a constructive trust - provided that (a) it is
an acknowledged principle of equity not only to avoid and redress
harm but also to prevent benefit from criminal action- which it
seems to be; (b) if this does not mean to retaliate criminal wrong
by civil wrong; and (c) if it can be shown that the nephew does
actually benefit from the death of the uncle even legally or materi-
ally in spite of his having full joint ownership before the uncle's
death.
We now turn to the minimum wage and flag salute cases where
3 115 N.Y. 506, 22 NY. 188 (1889).
4 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
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the axiological test is found in the Constitution. Both sets of cases
concern the constitutionality of certain rules or statutes. There-
fore we must first discuss the axiological function of the Consti-
tution.
So far we have answered three questions of the composite
question with which we started our discussion, namely, (1) what
are ethical values, (2) how are they derived, and (3) how do these
values affect the decisions of cases. One, ethical values are the
norms of axiology, based on the definition of good, the correctness
of subsumption, and the supremacy of intrinsic personality value
over extrinsic functional value. Axiology, particularly when writ-
ten in logical symbols, is as exact a science as is mathematics and
is to the humanities, including the law, what mathematics is to the
natural sciences. In another generation a lawyer will have to learn
this science as a physicist has to learn mathematics. Two, these
norms are derived by logic from formal and universal axioms, just
as are those of mathematics, and have their obligation in their
validity. Anybody is free to say that 2 x 2=5, but he would get in-
to an awful mess. It is equally disastrous, though equally easy, to
neglect the norms of axiology and morality. These norms are not
derived by theology or metaphysics. Axiology is as little meta-
physics or theology as is mathematics. There was a time when
mathematics was theology, from Pythagoras to the early Renais-
sance, as in Pico della Mirandola, and when mathematics was
methaphysics, as the imaginary number /-i was even for Leibniz
in the 17th century. For many, today, theory of value is still either
theology or metaphysics or both. But in the degree that axiology
becomes a science it sloughs off both theology and metaphysics.
The amount of theology and metaphysics in any science is a sign
of the incompleteness of the science. Newton's Mathematical Prin-
ciples of Philocophy still contained a great deal of theology, La-
place's, Celestial Mechanics, a hundred years later was pure as-
tronomy. Napoleon was rightly astonished that in Laplace's mathe-
matical system of the heavens God did not appear and Laplace was
right in his answer that he did not need the hypothesis of God in
astronomy, for astronomy was one thing and theology another. So
axiology is one thing and theology another. I would regard it as a
confusion of frames of reference if I would inject metaphysics or
theology into the discussion of ethical values. I like metaphysics
and theology as much as I like value theory. But our subject is
ethical values and the law in action and not metaphysics or religion
and the law in action - even though these too would be highly in-
teresting subjects. I firmly believe that the supremacy of human
personality is also grounded in the religious fact that we are chil-
dren of God and created in His image. But the religious framework
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is one thing and axiological science is another thing. Thus I re-
peat, the ethical values are derived from axiology by logic, and
we do not need any other hypothesis. Three, how do these values
affect the decision of cases? By the weighing of the relative value
of extrinsic functional and intrinsic personal goods and, in par-
ticular, of the values of correct subsumption against the evil, either
extrinsic or intrinsic, done by such subsumption. Intrinsic value
always supersedes extrinsic value.
We shall now answer the fourth and fifth parts of our initial
question. Namely, how do ethical values relate to the formulation
of statutes and the framing of constitutions? The answer is that
both statutes and constitutions must conform to the norms of axi-
ology, in particular in their guarantee of the intrinsic value of per-
sonality and their guarantee of equality before the law, i.e. of
equal and equitable subsumptions. When a constitution contains
these rights it is a good constitution and is, insofar, an axiological
document. Statutes may then be axiologically measured by their
conformity with the Constitution, and we do not have to refer them
directly to axiological norms, as we would have to do in countries
without any, or with a bad constitution. Measured thus, our con-
stitution is a good constitution and our statutes are good insofar as
they are constitutional. For, according to our definition, anything
is good which (a) is a member of its class and (b) has the attributes
of the class. Hence a constitution is good if (a) it is a constitution,
i.e. has behind it the obligatory power of the legalized popular will
and (b) has the attributes of a constitution, i.e. among other things
follows the norms of axiology. A statute then is good if (a) it is a
law, i.e. is passed by constitutional procedure and (b) has the at-
tributes of a law, i.e., among other things, is in conformity with the
substance of the constitution, i.e. its axiological normativity.
It is thus axiologically valid to ask whether the minimum wage
and the flag salute statutes are constitutional. In both sets of cases
we have in the first decision a confusion between intrinsic and
extrinsic values. The intrinsic value in both cases is that of per-
sonality, in the minimum wage case in its aspects of health and
morality, in the flag salute case in its aspect of conscience. The
extrinsic value in the minimum wage case is money, in the flag sa-
lute case it is national or collective unity. In both cases the trans-
position of values was corrected by the subsequent decision. In
both cases the value of the individual person won out over the value
of a function. To put the issue in the minimum wage case as one
between individualism and collectivism and say that the collectiv-
istic view won out, is in my opinion wrong. The individualistic view
won out and the issue was between personal value and functional
value or between a moral and an immoral view of the individual.
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It is also wrong to say that the so-called social conscience won out.
There is no social conscience as the conscience of a community-as-
such, but only the aggregate of individual consciences. Thus, even
from this point of view, it is the individual that won out, namely
those individuals who saw the intrinsic value of the case. Both
minimum wage laws in question were concerned with the personal
welfare, morality, and health of women and minors, that is to say
with their persons as intrinsic values and not with them in their
function as sellers of labor. The Adkins5 opinion which held mini-
mum wage legislation unconstitutional is bad according to both of
our axiological principles: it disregards the supremacy of personal
values over functional values and it contains a number of incorrect
subsumptions. It regards the minimum wage law in question as a
price fixing law and thus disregards the intrinsic values concerned,
committing the moral fallacy already observed by Immanuel Kant
of treating persons as things. For the essence of things is their
functions, whereas the essence of persons is not their functions but
their unique personalities. The transposition of extrinsic and in-
trinsic values appears clearly when it is stated that "in principle
there can be no difference between the case of selling one's labor
and the case of selling goods." There is of course all the difference
in the world, namely, the difference between people and things.
The Adkins opinion does not mention the purpose of the laws at all,
and thus ignores the intrinsic values at stake. Instead it elaborates
the extrinsic value purportedly violated by the law, namely free-
dom of contract. Thus it is led to a series of bad subsumptions,
which proves that bad axiology, in a state with a good constitution,
leads to bad law by forcing to bad subsumption. The forced sub-
sumption is the construction of freedom of contract under the con-
cept liberty, which the Constitution guarantees as an intrinsic per-
sonality value. Even if the Constitution would guarantee the right
of contract it would yet, as an extrinsic value, have to cede before
the intrinsic value which is the purpose of the laws in question.
As Justice Holmes well states in his dissent, and as Kelly-Harbison
and others point out in their works on the American Constitution,
the connection of the due process clause with substantive property
rights was a misconstruction of the meaning of the 14th Amend-
ment which was passed to protect negroes. In terms of our prin-
ciples, the class of "property" and of "due process of law" was ex-
panded without axiological justification. Thus not only the Con-
stitution was misinterpreted but also the concept of liberty of con-
tract itself, for liberty of contract does not mean liberty to make
disadvantageous contracts, just as liberty does not mean liberty to
death but to life, and life does not mean life in a prison but in lib-
s Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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erty. We thus have again the coordination of a class to unfitting at-
tributes, or a transposition of frames of reference, wich we called
"bad." Another such transposition is calling contracts between
necessitous women and their employers free contracts, and hence
subsuming them under the rule of liberty of contract, which itself
rested on false subsumption. In other words, we have here a false
subsumption in the second power. There cannot be liberty of con-
tract where the parties are not equal. "Necessitous men," as Lord
Northington already said in Vernon v. Bethell, "are not truly free
men but, to answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms
that the crafty may impose on them.' 6 The whole argument reminds
one of Anatole France's dictum that we are all free to sleep under
the bridges of Paris. Other bad subsumptions in the case are the
alleged difference between a regulation of hours and a regulation
of wages and the use of the Nineteenth Amendment to show that
there is no difference between men and women.
The Parrish7 case which reversed the Adkins decision puts
the right value in its place and sees the case as one concerning
intrinsic value. "What can be closer to the public interest than
the health of women and their protection?" Since here the court
was axiologically correct it also was legally correct and avoided
and corrected all the false subsumptions of the Adkins case.
Our axiological analysis of both cases has implications for
other decisions where the human value aspects and the difference
between persons and functions are of importance, such as the
interpretation of corporations as persons in the sense of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Taft-Hartley Act, which is now
before the Court, where trade unions, or associations of individual
persons for the betterment of their personal status are treated like
corporations organized for the production and sale of things.
In the first flag salute case s we have a transposition between
the intrinsic value of conscience and the extrinsic value of national
unity or the collectivity of the State, and hence according to our
axiological principles, this case was badly decided. The second
case9 reversed the first and hence was well decided. It rectified
the confusion of values. From our axiological principle, as ex-
pressed by the Constitution, of the supremacy of human conscience
over statute law, it is of course obvious that the statutes in these
cases are unconstitutional.
A community may be regarded as either an intrinsic or an
extrinsic value; in both cases, however, the intrinsic value of the
628 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (1762).
7 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
S Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
9 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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individual is supreme. The strength of a community lies in the
degree in which its members freely and strongly adhere to its
principles. In this sense the community is an aggregate of intrinsic
values, each unique in its kind and all achieving solidarity only
by the play of their full potentialities and rational capacities. Any
violation of individual freedom - except in cases of emergency
or by due process of law -is a weakening of the community.
Hence freedom of speech, worship, and conscience are not so much
individual rights but the very foundations of a healthy community,
as Spinoza saw long ago. There is no difference between the health
of the community and the welfare of the citizens. Hence also the
"general welfare" clause of the Constitution is primarily a matter
of individuals rather than of a collectivity. As an aggregate of
intrinsic values the community may be said to be an intrinsic
value itself. On the other hand, the community can be regarded
as an extrinsic value, since an individual is a member of a com-
munity only as a function, such as "voter," "citizen," etc., but not
with the totality of his entire personality. In this case the intrinsic
value of the individual takes precedence over the extrinsic value
of the community. No matter, therefore, how we look at the com-
munity, the intrinsic personality value takes precedence over
community values. Justices Jackson and Murphy follow this for-
mula, Justice Frankfurter does not. Justice Jackson rightly says,
in the opinion of the second case which reverses the first, that in
order to get strong community from free individualities we must
accept some queer individuals. As long as they do not cause us
clear and present danger we must let them alone. In the flag salute
case there was no emergency. First of all there was no war - it
was 18 months before Pearl Harbor, - secondly the action of a
handful of children is no clear and present danger to the commun-
ity under any conceivable circumstances. On the contrary, says
the opinion, the denial of freedom of conscience is the beginning
of a clear and present danger, namely, that of totalitarianism.
"Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find them-
selves exterminating dissenters." For this reason Justice Murphy
holds that "as a judge I have no loftier duty or responsibility than
to uphold that spiritual freedom to its farthest reaches." In other
words, both judges follow the axiological norm of the supremacy
of individual conscience over statute law and state another axio-
logical principle that free consciences make free societies. Both
arguments are therefore good. Justice Frankfurter's opinion and
dissent on the other hand are shot through with what I would
call collectivistic reasoning, namely the illicit valuation of collec-
tive over individual values. I cannot go into details but only want
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to mention the two occasions where he mentions values. 0 In the
first he says that "national unity", "national cohesion", etc., are
values that are "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values."
In the light of our axiological principles this is wrong. They are
inferior to the intrinsic value of personality. In the second he
says that all agree on the necessity of a free society, but there is
no science yet to show us how to achieve it, hence the flag salute
may as well do. But we know enough about values to know that
free men cannot be coerced into love of country - as little as
children can be spanked into love of parents. We need the inter-
play of free opinions to evolve love of country and also the inter-
play of legislative trial and error to evolve laws. But while the
Constitution has set limits to the freedom of lawmakers and put
it under supervision of the judiciary, it has put no limits to the
freedom of opinion makers in free speech or of worship to one's
Maker in individual conscience. It is for this very reason that
we accepted the Constitution as an axiological instrument. It was
wisdom itself for the framers of the Constitution to guarantee the
freedom of conscience over the freedom of lawmakers to make
laws, for the laws are (a) compromises of consciences and (b) more
dangerous to the community than individual thought expressions.
Individual thought expressions can only rarely lead to disaster,
but wrong laws can do so quickly. There is a limit to the legal
experimentation with democracy. It can end in the ruins of a
country, such as Germany. It is absurd, namely a transposition of
frames of reference, for Justice Frankfurter to appeal to the free-
dom of legislatures in a case where he denies the freedom of
conscience. The view of Justice Frankfurter that "law is con-
cerned with external behavior and not with the inner life of man.
It rests in large measure upon compulsion," should have brought
him to the conclusion that for this very reason the inner life of
man was exempted from the law by the Constitution. Instead he
uses this statement to subject conscience under law.
The Shoshone" case shows again the transposition of legality
and illegality which we found in the brief of the highway robber,
and that of freedom of contract and inequality of the parties which
we had in the minimum wage case, only on the higher level of
nations. I shall not treat this case as a matter of international law
for the term "international law" does not exist in axiology. I
shall treat it within the categories we developed, namely, those of
1OFor a fuller discussion of this case see the Second Report of the Com-
nittee for Cooperative Research in Values, Department of Philosophy, Wayne
University, Detroit, November, 1950.
11 Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335
(1945).
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good and bad, might and right. The only difference between these
categories as used in the previous cases is that the parties are
nations rather than individuals. This has axiological consequences
concerning the rights of the individual Indian, but I shall not
discuss them for they do not immediately concern the present
case. The majority decision in the Shoshone case is bad since it
is based on the same kind of transposition of frames of reference
as in the cases mentioned. The Shoshone "contract" on which the
decision is based lacks the essential attributes of a contract, in
particular equality of the parties. Hence, though it looks like a
contract it lacks the attributes of a contract according to our def-
inition. It is even less a contract than that between necessitous
women workers and their employers. It is a contract only in the
sense of that of the highway robbers on Black Heath with a gen-
tleman who had several things to dispose of which, "after some
small discourse with the said gentleman were dealt for at a very
cheap rate." In other words, they are based on pure might and
therefore far from being contracts are not even law according to
our axiological principle that an illegal situation has no room for
legality. Even if, however, the contract would be regarded as law
and as a valid contract, the decision would be false because of
false subsumption. The text of the contract, in my opinion, clearly
shows that it acknowledges the territorial rights of the Indians.
Hence their claims should be honored, - either as a moral and
social- obligation of the United States,- or as a legal obligation.
The problem of the Indians is of course much deeper than is
indicated by the case. It is really the problem whether and how
a primitive society can survive as an island within a modern so-
ciety, and whether and how the tribal being that the Indian is to-
day should be made into the responsible individual, subject only
to his own conscience. From a moral point of view Indian society
is as good as is modern society, only the frame of reference is dif-
ferent. Hence again we have the problem of frames of reference.
The axiological problem is: how can two frames of reference coexist
within one higher frame of reference. I cannot go into the details
except by stating that the answer is mutual adaptation. Ae we have
interplay of individual minds making democracy, so we have inter-
play of societies, making international democracy. At present our
international life does not evince the creative give and take of mu-
tual recognition of values.
So much, and very cursory indeed, to our cases. It is to be
hoped that as the science of axiology will be developed and the
theology and metaphysics of today's ethics will be translated into
the detailed norms of a science of human behavior, our morality
will become as definite as our science and judges and legislators,
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as well as the general public, will have definite guideposts for
their decisions. Such a science is now in the making. In another
generation it will be a definite body of possible frames of reference
for all kinds of situations-a "mathematics" of the humanities,
based on a logic not of quantity but of quality, and known to all
scholars and practitioners of the law as their ultimate frame of
reference. There are those, of course, who say that such a science
is impossible. Far from taking issue with them we accept their
statement and apply to it the words of Goethe: "The possible will
be attempted only because we have postulated the impossible."
